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SDSR 2010 was criticised almost from the moment it was published for its lack of
strategic direction and its failure to deal with the challenges facing British defence
and security policy.1 The Conservative Government elected in May 2015 was
therefore under pressure to come up with a document that was far more strategic in
outlook and was not focused purely on cost cutting, given the changes in the
international environment over the preceding five years. A combined SDSR and
National Security Strategy (NSS) was published in November 2015 which contained
what many considered to be some positive developments for British defence and
security. These included the funding of extra resources for combatting terrorism and
for addressing significant technological challenges, including the growing threat of
cyber warfare2; they also included a restructuring of the armed forces.2
However, an analysis of SDSR 2015 and the Defence Fact Sheets that support them
reveal that, when it comes to the restructuring of the British Army, there is little detail
underlying the broad statements of intent. The Army now has a force structure it can
develop around but what exactly is the desired 'end state'? As part of Joint Force
2025, the Army is to 'recover' from the effects of fighting two long counterinsurgency
operations and return to a more flexible, mobile stance. It will be able to contribute
around 40,000 personnel to a divisional-level expeditionary force of around 50,000,
but how is it supposed to rapidly deploy what will constitute virtually half its regular
strength? It is also supposed to be able to contribute up to 10,000 personnel to
smaller contingencies, including flood and emergency relief here in the UK. From
which formations will these personnel be drawn? What will be the impact on
readiness levels? What can be done to boost the retention of quality personnel?3
How will all this be affected by the continued difficulty the MOD has had in recruiting
reserves, the target for which is now 35,000? Has there been a change of emphasis
in their planned use?4
A central component of the reorganisation is the formation of two new 'strike'
brigades. Given that the number of brigades in both the Reaction Force and
Adaptable Force (formed under the Army 2020 force structure) is staying the same
(at eleven) it looks as if the two strike brigades will be formed by 'downgrading' one
of the armoured infantry brigades and 'upgrading' one of the infantry brigades, but
what exactly does that mean and what support assets will they contain? No detailed
organisational charts have yet been published, and the only information available
about them is that each will be a 'medium' brigade, have 5,000 personnel in three
battalions and be equipped with the Ajax AFV and an as yet undetermined
mechanised infantry vehicle (MIV). If an armoured infantry brigade is re-roled, what
will happen to the armoured regiment? If the idea is rapid mobility, which combat
support and combat service support assets will be included? Will the UK look again
at acquiring the M777 155mm lightweight howitzer?5 Being such an unknown
quantity, how can the strike brigade's transportation and logistics requirements be
gauged and planning begin?
Under the plans for Army 2020, 589 Ajax vehicles (which are supposed to be around
forty-two tons) were ordered, so as to equip three cavalry regiments (one for each
armoured infantry brigade) and nine reconnaissance platoons (one for each of the
three armoured regiments and six armoured infantry battalions in the three armoured
infantry brigades). How will Ajax be distributed? If the total ordered doesn't increase,
how will the fleet be managed so that the fourth brigade is covered? If the numbers
do not increase, it might just be possible to equip four cavalry regiments (one for
each of the strike and armoured infantry brigades) as well as the
reconnaissance platoons within the armoured regiments and armoured infantry
battalions, with a bit of creative whole fleet management or limiting access to only
those units that are actually deploying.
There is no detail on the mechanised infantry vehicle (MIV), only that it was originally
intended to replace the Mastiff and Ridgeback MRAP vehicles and is likely to be a
wheeled 8x8 MRAP-style vehicle. The exact roles both Ajax and the new MIV are
intended to fulfil, and what that means doctrinally, needs to be clarified. What will the
impact be on sustainment, air-land integration and force readiness? What is the
procurement timeframe of the new MIV and how will it interact with Ajax and
Challenger II?6
Such questions need to be answered quickly, if the British Army is to reorganise
itself and move forward under the plans for Joint Force 2025.
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